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1. Overview  
Over 2,200 years ago the ancient Silk Road was a network of trade routes that connected China 
with the west. Back then, this network provided a westward route for Chinese technology and 
inventions including papermaking and woodblock printing, which allowed printing in large 
quantities for the first time, and later, “movable type printing”, a technology which went on to 
revolutionise information sharing in Europe. An early version of the magnetic compass is also 
believed to have reached Europe via the Silk Road. Moreover, Chinese alchemists inadvertently 
invented gunpowder while attempting to create an immortality potion and was then traded to the 
outside world via the ancient Silk Road (Fung et al. 2018). As these ancient Chinese 
technologies – and others – spread through the ancient Silk Road they had a profound impact on 
the rest of world. Today the Digital Silk Road has similar aspirations.  
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced aspirations to revive a modern 21st century 
version of the Silk Road, now known as the Silk Road Economic Belt. A few months later he 
announced plans for a 21st century “maritime road”, now referred to as the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road. Together these two initiatives are known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) or 
more commonly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese leadership has called the BRI 
“the project of the century”. The project is expected to cost more than 1 trillion USD, and include 
over 70 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, accounting for about half of the world’s population 
and a fourth of GDP (Kuo & Kommenda 2018).  In 2015, the Chinese government published a 
framework titled  “Vision and actions on jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road”, in which it formalised five priority areas for the BRI: (i) policy 
cooperation; (ii) connectivity of facilities; (iii) unimpeded trade; (iv) financial integration; and 
(v) people-to-people exchange (People’s Republic of China 2015). 
Regarding connectivity, the BRI aims to help countries “improve the connectivity of their 
infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems, jointly push forward the 
construction of international trunk passageways, and form an infrastructure network connecting 
all sub-regions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa” (ibid.). It gives priority to “linking up 
unconnected road stations, removing transport bottlenecks, advancing road safety facilities and 
traffic management facilities and equipment and improving road network connectivity… and 
push[ing] forward port infrastructure construction.... Increas[ing] sea routes and number of 
voyages”, as well as “promoting cooperation in the connectivity of energy infrastructure” (ibid.).  
Along with roads, ports, and energy infrastructure projects, the connectivity focus area also 
stated that China and BRI countries should “jointly advance the construction of cross-border 
optical cables and other communications trunk line networks, improve international 
communications connectivity, and create an Information Silk Road. [The BRI] should build 
bilateral cross-border optical cable networks at a quicker pace, plan transcontinental submarine 
optical cable projects, and improve spatial (satellite) information passageways to expand 
information exchanges and cooperation.” 
Despite being engrained in the BRI’s vision, the digital infrastructure element of the initiative has 
been largely overlooked in BRI literature and in the media, which have overwhelmingly focused 
on roads, ports, and energy infrastructure while undervaluing “the massive digital infrastructures 
(e.g. fibre-optic cables and data centres) that have been [built] alongside transport and energy 
projects” (Shen 2018: 2684). Moreover, a deeper look at projects being pushed forward as part 
of the “Digital Silk Road” illustrate that the BRI’s digital aspirations go beyond the construction of 
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information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and include exporting digital 
technologies and the expansion of digital firms. At the time of writing (July 2018), the Digital Silk 
Road had not yet been analysed from a development perspective. This Emerging Issues report 
adds to the body of literature on the BRI and the Digital Silk Road by analysing several aspects 
of the Digital Silk Road using a Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) lens.  
This report is divided into four main parts. Section 2 summarises the general literature on ICTs 
and the SDGs to illustrate both synergies and potential trade-offs between accelerating ICT 
adoption and achieving complex development goals. It first identifies key SDGs that explicitly call 
for greater ICT adoption and access to ICT infrastructure, and then covers the literature in five 
key areas: (i) the relationship between ICTs and economic growth and using ICTs to achieve 
development outcomes; (ii) the relationship between ICTs and inequality and the “leave no one 
behind” (LNOB) agenda; (iii) digital barriers and inequality that go beyond the provision of 
infrastructure; (iv) ICTs and the future of work; and (v) ICTs and environmental sustainability. 
Although digital technologies could be a force for good and help achieve the SDGs, this 
trajectory is not automatic, nor is it a given, and in many regards current trends can lead to the 
contrary. Achieving the SDGs in an increasingly digital world will necessarily mean reversing 
negative trends and finding ways to deal with some of the challenges emerging from greater ICT 
adoption. This will require actions above and beyond building infrastructure from a wide range of 
actors.  
Section 3 covers the “Digital Silk Road” and analyses it according to the literature on the 
interactions between ICTs and the SDGs covered in the previous section. It starts by covering 
some of the policy objectives of the Digital Silk Road. It then lightly analyses potential SDG 
contributions and challenges on some of the main elements of the Digital Silk Road including: 
ICT infrastructure, the growing market share of Chinese device manufacturers, the promotion of 
“inclusive globalisation” through e-commerce, the exportation of “smart cities” to countries along 
the BRI, the expansion of China’s internet giants, and the Digital Belt and Road Program Science 
Plan. Overall, Section 3 highlights that although Chinese actors in the BRI often frame their 
activities as having only positive SDG impacts, they fail to consider the potential challenges 
arising from a greater adoption of ICTs and digitisation including: the potential of increasing 
inequalities, the implications for leaving no one behind, energy consumption and e-waste among 
others.  
Section 4 concludes and provides policy recommendations for traditional development actors 
seeking to engage with the Digital Silk Road. It suggests that traditional donors should: (a) use 
their convening power to bring together a diverse group of stakeholders to work through the 
complexities of achieving the SDGs as ICTs continue to spread; (b) be honest knowledge 
brokers for developing country governments about ICTs and their synergies and trade-offs with 
achieving the SDGs; (c) work on providing offline channels so the unconnected do not fall further 
behind; and (d) focus on the future of work which largely gets overlooked in the Digital Silk Road. 
However, direct partnerships in digital BRI projects may be risky for traditional development 
donors due to concerns that may not bode well with their citizens about the Digital Silk Road 
spreading an unfree internet and technologies that could be used to empower governments while 
disempowering citizens.  
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2. The relationship between ICTs and the SDGs 
2.1 ICTs in the SDGs 
The use of technology in the development sector dates back to the sector’s origins. US President 
Harry Truman’s inaugural address in 1949 is often cited as the birth of the development sector 
(Sachs 1992). In his speech Truman suggests that the US “must embark on a bold new program 
for making the benefits of [its] scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”.1 Although Truman’s envisioned approach of 
inserting technology to “westernise” the rest of the world, or make it more like the US has been 
widely criticised (ibid.), the use of technology in the hope of achieving complex development 
goals has been a mainstay in the development sector and has since been continuously adjusted 
to reflect dominant development theories, paradigms and practice (Heeks 2018).  
Thus, it is not surprising that the most widely diffused set of technologies of our time – digital 
technologies – have been incorporated into both sets of global goals – the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the SDGs – which have largely shaped aid funding and the 
efforts of development practitioners in the last two decades. MDG 8 called for cooperation with 
the private sector to make the benefits of new technologies “especially Information and 
Communications Technologies” available to more people (United Nations 2010). Likewise, the 
current SDGs that underpin development efforts between 2016 and 2030 have included three 
goals and targets that explicitly call for the spread of ICTs:   
SDG 9.C: “Significantly increase access to information and communications technology 
and strive to promote universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed 
countries by 2020”. 
Target 9.C.1: “Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology”. 
SDG 5.B: “Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and 
communications technology to promote the empowerment of women”. 
Target 5.B.1: “Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex”. 
SDG 17.8: “Fully operationalize the technology bank and science technology and 
innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developing countries by 2017 and 
enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications 
technology”. 
Target 17.8.1: “Proportion of individuals using the Internet”. 
We are currently not on track to achieve universal connectivity by 2020 as per SDG 9.C. 
Although it is common to come across stats stating that over 4 billion people or more than half 
the global population are online2, the annual year-on-year growth in internet users declined from 
12% between 2015 and 2016 to 7% between 2016 and 2017 (Meeker 2018). Moreover, 
according to the United Nations’ (2018a: 19) report, Progress towards the Sustainable 
Development Goals, “high-speed internet penetration remains very low in developing countries 
(6% compared to 24% in developed countries) and limited access, capacity, and speed of fixed 
broadband connections limits the ability of ICTs to be used as a development tool and threatens 




to widen existing inequalities”. Moreover, despite goals and targets that explicitly call for making 
ICTs accessible to all and for the use of ICTs to achieve development impacts, some ICT4D (ICT 
for Development) scholars have criticised the lack of further integration of ICTs in the SDGs 
because of their potential to both have impacts across the other SDGs and to amplify disparities 
in gains across them (ITU 2017; Unwin 2017, among others).  
2.2 ICT-enabled growth and development gains 
Investments in ICT infrastructure (including mobile and broadband networks) and ICT adoption 
are often portrayed as having a positive impact on development by spurring economic growth 
(SDG 8).  However, whether investments in ICT infrastructure or ICT adoption cause economic 
growth on their own is contested. Galperin and Viecens (2017) found that studies widely cited as 
evidence of a causal relationship – including Qiang et al. (2009) – suffer from limitations to their 
validity because they are unable to account for possibilities that economic growth may be 
causing ICT adoption, that they are both caused by a third variable (e.g. good governance), that 
they may be simultaneously causing one another, or that the correlation may be due to chance. 
Moreover, some studies found that ICTs were only shown to have a significant impact on 
economic growth after a significant portion of a country’s population adopted ICTs (Minges 
2015). Therefore, “while the evidence indicates that advanced economies are reaping significant 
benefits from internet investments, the returns for less advanced economies, and in particular for 
the fight against poverty in these regions, remains uncertain” (Galperin and Viecens 2017: 315). 
Friederici et al. (2017: 7) found that despite inconclusive evidence, all African country ICT policy 
documents they reviewed “make explicit claims that increasing connectivity (particularly through 
the implementation of the ICT policy) leads to economic growth and other types of development 
impacts. These statements tend to paint a picture of ultimately large impacts and do not refer to 
evidence.” 
One criticism of the way in which ICTs have been included in the SDGs is that they do not 
adequately capture all potential ways ICTs can impact all SDGs. An ITU (2017) report presents 
examples and case studies of how ICTs can be leveraged for impacts across the SDGs. 
However, along with other prominent development reports, including the 2016 World 
Development Report and the 2016 Human Development Report, it also warned that the impact of 
ICTs on the SDGs is not always automatic or positive (World Bank 2016; UNDP 2016). While 
ICTs can help provide access to financial services and affordable clean energy to people for the 
first time and make cities more livable, it is also true “that technologies can widen disparities 
between rich and poor, women and men, and disadvantaged communities and everyone else… 
[and that] the people with the most to gain from ICTs are also those most likely to be locked out 
of the benefits” (ITU 2017: 9–10). The coexistence of positive and exclusionary relationships 
between ICTs and development gains is troublesome given SDGs 10 and 4 are centred on 
reducing inequalities and achieving gender equality respectively (ITU 2017).  
2.3.1 Leaving no one behind amidst ICT-enabled (in)equality 
Unwin (2017) argues that there has been an over-emphasis on using ICTs for the sole purpose 
of increasing economic growth or improving development outcomes without enough appreciation 
for how ICT diffusion can increase inequalities between individuals with differing access to ICTs 
and levels of digital skills and between owners of capital and employees. Moreover, because 
digital inequalities may lead to uneven impacts across the SDGs for individuals (ITU 2017), ICTs 
threaten to increase social, economic and political disadvantage and inequality thus threatening 
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stability and future economic growth and limiting SDG achievement unless this trend is reversed 
(Unwin 2017). 
Although poverty reduction during the MDG era was substantial, the MDGs have been criticised  
for having average-based targets that incentivised governments and development actors to 
target the “low-hanging fruit” or those nearest to escaping poverty rather than the poorest or most 
marginalised (Burns et al. 2013; Stuart and Samman 2017; UNICEF 2015). This translated into 
wider gaps between the poorest children and other children within countries (UNICEF 2015). 
Those left behind from MDG gains disproportionately belonged to already marginalised and 
vulnerable groups including the extreme poor, religious and ethnic minorities, indigenous groups, 
the LGBTQI community, refugees and migrants (UNDP 2016). Moreover, people experiencing 
deprivations across economic, social discrimination, and spatial dimensions (e.g. urban slums 
and remote areas) were especially prone to being left behind (Burns et al. 2013). Lessons 
learned from the MDGs led to the SDGs adopting the LNOB agenda, a commitment across all 
SDG targets and indicators that prioritised reaching the poorest, most marginalised and hardest 
to reach first. 
People are gradually turning to digital technologies to do things previously done offline and digital 
technologies are increasingly the preferred or default medium. Across sectors, actors in 
developing countries are moving services with SDG and development implications to digital 
channels. This is allowing well-connected and digitally capable citizens to extract SDG-related 
gains from digital technologies, but there is growing evidence that those that are not connected 
or do not have digital skills are being left out from these gains and risk being left further behind 
(Hernandez & Roberts 2018). One especially concerning trend found in the United Nation’s 2018 
e-government survey is that governments are increasingly implementing “digital first” strategies 
that prioritise reaching citizens via digital channels before building offline channels and in some 
cases offering “digital by default” services that are only online (United Nations 2018b). Although 
these strategies can cut down on costs, they risk creating a new “low-hanging fruit”, those 
fortunate enough to be digitally connected. Although the digitally connected may include many of 
the poor, women, people living in remote areas, and other disadvantaged groups, the most poor 
and marginalised are least likely to be connected and risk being left behind (Hernandez & 
Roberts 2018). 
The ICT and development literature highlights that already better-off groups (urban dwellers, the 
wealthy, well-educated people, and men) tend to adopt ICTs first and are better positioned to 
gain from digitisation. Meanwhile, those likely to be left behind by technology are the same 
disadvantaged groups that have historically been left behind and who would benefit most from 
their use: the extreme poor, rural and remote communities, indigenous groups and ethnic 
minorities, women, the uneducated, disabled, etc. with the addition of the elderly as a new group 
(United Nations 2018b; World Bank 2016). Although SDG 5.B, acknowledges the need to spread 
ICTs to reach more women, the SDGs do not explicitly call for a spread of ICTs that targets these 
other groups. Moreover, whereas the general development literature has stressed that those 
most likely to be left behind often face multiple forms of oppression across economic, social 
discrimination and spatial dimensions, there has been much less literature on the relationship 
between multiple forms of oppression and digital inequalities (Hernandez & Roberts 2018).  
As more people go online, it is more important than ever for businesses to maintain an online 
presence to stay competitive. The internet may open new markets for businesses beyond their 
geographical proximity via e-commerce, provide access to digital and web-based efficiency 
improving software, and make it easier to subcontract expertise (Sharafat and Lehr 2017; 
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World Bank 2016). However, digital inequalities are also observed between firms. Businesses in 
low-income countries are less likely to be online, especially in least developed and landlocked 
countries. Moreover, UNCTAD (2017) finds that small businesses consistently lag behind in 
internet usage compared to larger firms and receive less orders online in all countries where data 
are disaggregated by firm size. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) disproportionately 
face barriers to e-commerce including: lack of awareness; lack of access, affordability, and skills; 
poor availability of international and local payment solutions; lack of access to cost-effective 
logistics; limited capabilities to manage requests and relationships with international customers; 
low visibility and lack of reputation; and lack of ability to confirm with legal and fiscal 
requirements in foreign markets (ibid.).  
2.3.2 Addressing barriers beyond infrastructure  
Because digital inequalities persist and threaten to leave the disadvantaged further behind, “for 
ICTs effectively to deliver the SDGs they must be used to empower the poorest, and not just 
deliver economic growth” (Unwin 2017: 39). This means going beyond the necessary but 
insufficient act of building digital infrastructure. There is also a need to overcome demand-side 
barriers, which often deter potential users from going online even when there is sufficient supply 
(ibid.). Roberts & Hernandez’s (2017) “five As of technology access” provide a neat way of 
categorising the main barriers to access:  
1. Availability – whether or not connectivity is available in a given context. This is 
especially relevant to poor and indigenous communities who are more likely to live in 
areas without mobile coverage. Telecommunications companies have historically 
prioritised reaching relatively wealthier places with buying power. Poor rural areas 
with scattered populations have been deemed unprofitable and thus infrastructure 
has not been built for them or to the same standard. Even when connectivity is 
available, poorer places are more likely to experience slower and less reliable 
connections (UNCTAD 2017). 
2. Affordability includes the price of handsets, data, and maintaining a device. 
Although prices have generally decreased, data shows that there is an adverse 
correlation between the income level of a country and the price of connectivity 
relative to Gross National Income per capita, that the poor are especially less likely to 
afford connectivity, and that women are more likely than men to be unable to afford 
connectivity (GSMA 2016; Unwin 2017).  
3. Awareness refers to being aware not just of the digital technologies themselves and 
some of its main uses, but also awareness of specific apps, platforms, and websites 
relevant to one’s own experience. A GSMA (2016) study finds “awareness and lack 
of relevant content” as the main barrier in six of seven Asian countries surveyed.  
4. Ability – Some potential users can be held back from using digital technology by an 
inadequate level of skills including both language literacy (being able to read and 
write) and digital literacy (being able to navigate digital technology). The required 
ability to be an effective digital citizen is a moving target. UNESCO (2018) suggests 
that today it should also include the ability to understand visual representation, 
creatively re-use information, and evaluate the validity of information (e.g. fake news), 
amongst others. Furthermore, in many places, social norms may predetermine that it 
is culturally unacceptable or that it is unsafe for women to be online or their access 
may be mediated by a male gatekeeper hindering their ability to gain access. 
5. Accessibility is composed of two main sub-components.  
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a. Disability – 15% of the global population lives with some form of 
disability (WHO 2011). Although digital technologies can be an “enabler” 
for people with some disabilities (e.g. ones that mainly affect their 
mobility), some disabilities like blindness may hinder use of digital 
technology if technologies are not designed with disabled users in mind. 
b. Relevant content – much of the internet remains dominated by a few 
languages. If the internet does not contain content that is both accessible 
(in language and format) and relevant, people are unlikely to perceive it 
as useful. At the time of writing, 53% of all websites were in English and 
10 languages made up almost 90% of all web content.3  
The above barriers disproportionately affect the poor and marginalised whom are more likely to 
be hindered by one or more of these barriers. It is worth noting that digital inequalities are not 
binary disparities in access between users and non-users, but multifaceted and multidimensional 
(Ramalingam & Hernandez 2016; United Nations 2018b) (see Table 1). It is beyond the scope of 
this report to go into the multiple dimensions of digital inequalities in detail but some of them 
include but are not limited to divides between: geographies, socially stratified groups (e.g. 
gender, rich and poor, men and women, citizens and migrants, etc.), type of device, literacy, 
device owners and users that mainly share a device, speed of connection and bandwidth, and 
content consumers and producers, among others. Thus, tackling digital inequalities goes beyond 
mere infrastructure and device provision.  
Table 1: A selection of digital divides 
Divide Description 
Access 
It starts with access or the lack thereof: although internet penetration has 
increased, it continues to be a key barrier as more people globally remain 
offline rather than online 
Affordability The gap between rich and poor affects affordability of ICTs and serves as an 
important difference in adoption within countries as much as between them 
Age Older people are generally using ICTs to a lesser extent than younger 
populations, despite the notion that they could benefit from online social and 
health services 
Bandwidth International bandwidth and the capacity to transmit and receive information 
over networks varies greatly between countries and also within them, 
limiting potential useful endeavours 
Content Relevant content in local language(s) is important to stimulate adoption 
Disability Those with disabilities face additional hurdles to use ICTs if websites are not 
compliant with web accessibility guidelines 
Education Like social divides, education and literacy rates are fundamental challenges 
to bridge digital divides 
Gender There is a small but persistent difference in online usage between men and 
women 
                                                   
3 https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_language/all 
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Migration Migrants may not possess the same levels of digital skills as the population 
in their new country and if they do, may be subject to content and language 
divides 
Location Rural and remote areas are often at a disadvantage in terms of speed and 
quality of services as compared to their urban counterparts 
Mobile Mobile devices provide opportunities to bridge the access gap but can also 
introduce new forms of divides in terms of technology, speed and usage 
Speed The gap between basic and broadband access is creating a new divide as 
speed is important to reap the full benefits of a digital society 
Useful usage What people do with their access is a key difference in whether users take 
full advantage of ICTs, such as e-government services 
Note: The above table is intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive 
Source: United Nations (2018b) 
Similar to how the SDGs call for prioritising the hardest to reach, using ICTs to achieve the SDGs 
while ensuring they do not increase inequalities and thus hinder our ability to achieve the SDGs 
requires that digital inclusion efforts prioritise the people hardest to reach first. Reaching the 
hardest to reach first will be necessary in efforts regarding building digital infrastructure in poor 
and far-flung geographies, improving digital skills for those least likely to have them, generating 
content in under-represented languages, and finding ways of getting devices and technology in 
the hands of the poorest and most powerless (Unwin 2017).  
2.4 ICTs and the future of work 
SDG 8 calls for “productive employment and decent work for all”. Although the spread of ICTs 
can create more jobs, this trajectory is not a given and could lead to the opposite or increasing 
income inequality if policies and technological innovations are poorly designed or introduced 
without incentives to augment workers rather than displace them (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014; 
Sharafat & Lehr 2017; World Bank 2016). The same efficiency gains offered by ICTs threaten to 
displace workers and/or exacerbate earning inequalities between workers with in-demand skills 
and those without them. Up to two thirds of jobs are projected to be susceptible to automation in 
developing countries and as much as 85% in Ethiopia (World Bank 2016). Whether or not digital 
technologies will displace workers remains unclear and speculative. These predictions have 
been contested. Scholars using different methods have predicted that automation does not pose 
a significant risk to employment levels (Kapoor et al. 2018). However, scholars still warn that 
even if workplace automation does not decrease overall employment levels, there is still a risk of 
increasing income inequality (SDG 10) if disparities in education levels (SDG 4) and digital skills 
(SDG 4.4.1) persist (Acemoglu & Restrepo 2018). Moreover, although digital technologies have 
generated new forms of employment through “digital work”, these jobs also require internet 
access and are subject to education and skills biases which mirror offline inequalities (World 
Bank 2016).  
This can be worrisome for the LNOB agenda because the already well off are more likely to 
possess the levels of education and digital skills needed to extract higher values from the job 
market whilst the poorer and more marginalised are more likely to lack them (World Bank 2016). 
Moreover, there are concerns that women and girls are more vulnerable to being left behind 
without the reversal of social norms and current education and employment trends (Faith 2017). 
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The relationship between automation, digital skills, and inequality is well captured in the following 
quote:  
There’s never been a better time to be a worker with special skills or the right education, 
because these people can use technology to create and capture value. However, there’s 
never been a worse time to be a worker with only “ordinary” skills and abilities to offer, 
because computers, robots, and other digital technologies are acquiring these skills and 
abilities at an extraordinary rate (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014). 
2.5 ICTs and environmental sustainability  
There are also concerns about how “sustainable” digital technologies are, due to their 
environmental footprint and the predominant business model on which the spread of digital 
devices is based (Unwin 2017). It is still unclear whether ICTs have a net positive or negative 
impact on sustainability. Although the ICT sector unloads greenhouse emissions from other 
sectors through efficiency gains, digitising previously analogue services, and reducing the need 
to travel, among others, this has also coincided with the ICT sector increasing its own energy 
emissions (Unwin 2017). A phenomenon known as the “Jevons Paradox” suggests that when 
energy efficiency improves, users tend to demand more of it rather than less because price 
decreases incentivise innovative uses of energy that were not economically feasible previously 
thus offsetting gains and potentially even overshadowing them over time (Gossart 2014).   
If the IT sector were a country, it would rank third in the world in energy consumption behind 
China and the US (Greenpeace 2017a). The share of global electricity consumed by ICTs was 
4.7% in 2012 and is expected to rise to 14% by 2020 (Van Heddeghem et al. 2014). Andrae & 
Edler (2015) projected the IT sector’s energy usage until 2030 under best, expected, and worst 
case scenarios. In all scenarios, the share of electricity consumed and greenhouse gases 
emitted by the ICT sector are expected to increase from 2012 levels. Under the likely scenario, 
ICTs will account for 21% of energy consumption by 2030. Under the best case scenario, ICT 
energy efficiency improves and accounts for 8% of energy usage. Under the worst case 
scenario, ICTs can account for up to 51% of all electricity consumption by 2030 and emit up to 
23% of greenhouse gases (ibid.). These scenarios illustrate that there is a need to increase the 
energy efficiency of the sector as well as ensure that it is powered by renewable energy if the 
sector is to not derail global environmental sustainability efforts. Moreover, these estimates were 
made before cryptocurrency (e.g. bitcoin) mining became the heavy energy consumer it is today. 
Bitcoin mining energy consumption is believed to be growing at 25% a month and on pace to 
consume as much electricity as the US by as early as 2019 and the rest of the world by 2020 
(Jezard 2017). 
Although the explosion of data and new data analytic tools can be leveraged to improve SDG 
outcomes by, for example, monitoring the environment and resource allocation, data centres 
storing data “in the cloud” and networks transmitting data now consume a greater amount of 
electricity. Data centres and networks accounted for 15% and 20% of the IT sector’s electricity 
consumption in 2012 respectively and rose to 21% and 29% by 2017 (Greenpeace 2017a).  
Although device and IT equipment energy efficiency is improving, the rapid expansion of the 
internet to more users combined with users consuming more data has outpaced these gains. 
Video streaming – a data-intensive activity – now makes up 60% of all internet traffic and is 
expected to increase to 80% by 2020 (ibid.). This poses serious challenges for climate change if 
electricity is not supplied via renewable energy. Despite great strides made by some firms in the 
IT sector including Facebook, Google and Apple making commitments to 100% renewable 
10 
energy in the near future, renewable energy still only accounts for a small fraction of energy 
consumed by data centres and is as low as 5%, 4.2%, and 1% in China, Taiwan, and South 
Korea respectively (Greenpeace 2017a).  
Moreover, universal ICT adoption requires more devices. The current dominant business model 
of ICT device manufacturers is centred on “planned obsolescence” in which manufacturers 
attempt to incentivise buyers to continuously buy the latest device while relinquishing their old 
ones even when they function perfectly well. This has direct environmental implications through 
the generation of e-waste which is predominately dumped in developing countries often causing 
environmental damage and toxic exposure to informal workers including women and children 
(Perkins et al. 2014; Unwin 2017). Moreover, there are concerns about mining activities and 
labour practices along the ICT device supply chain (Unwin 2017). The extraction of cobalt, one of 
the essential raw materials in mobile phones, exposes miners to environmental risks and is 
largely dependent on labourers, including children, working in slave-like conditions (SDGs 8.7 
and 16.2) (Amnesty International 2016).  
This section has shown that the relationship between ICTs and the SDGs is complex, non-linear, 
multifaceted and not always positive. Therefore, no single actor can enable ICTs being used in a 
way that promotes sustainable development. Working through this complexity will require action 
and coordination between many actors including government, the private sector, civil society, 
and citizens – including the unconnected and those at risk of being left behind – to come up with 
solutions that stand the chance of being successful and sustainable (Unwin 2017). ICTs can be 
used in ways that help to achieve the SDGs. However, as the literature in this section illustrates, 
failure to put together holistic ICT policies and adopt practices that are conducive to sustainable 
development may result in the reverse. How we act now regarding ICTs will shape our ability to 
achieve the SDGs. The many challenges presented in this section have shown that digital 
infrastructure alone is unlikely to be sufficient for ICTs to have a positive impact on the SDGs. 
Instead, as Sharafat & Lehr (2017: 30) argue, many factors need to be considered and 
coordinated including “government policies and actions, infrastructure investment, applications 
and content, markets and competition, government budgets, and ICT skills and education”. Given 
the complexity of the interaction between ICTs and the SDGs there is a need to look beyond 
targets and plans for ICT-specific SDG goals and targets and consider how ICTs can contribute – 
both positively and negatively – to all the other SDGs and set targets accordingly (Unwin 2017).  
3. BRI ambition and intent in investing in digital 
connectivity and ICTs 
The Digital Silk Road has been largely overlooked in the BRI literature which has overwhelmingly 
focused on roads, ports, and energy infrastructure while undervaluing “the massive digital 
infrastructures (e.g. fiber-optic cables and data centers) that have been [built] alongside transport 
and energy projects” (Shen 2018: 2684). A deeper look at projects branded as part of the “Digital 
Silk Road” illustrate that China’s digital aspirations go beyond the construction of fibre-optic 
cables and encompass a wide range of technologies as China races ahead to become a world 
leader in not just ICT infrastructure but also digital technology more generally.   
Although the BRI was first announced in 2013, the Digital Silk Road seems to have taken off in 
2015 when “Vision and actions on jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century 
Maritime Road” – often cited as the guiding framework for the initiative – called for the creation of 
an “information Silk Road” by building  “bilateral cross-border optical cable networks at a quicker 
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pace, plan[ning] transcontinental submarine optical cable projects, and improv[ing] (satellite) 
information passageways to expand information exchanges and cooperation” and “promot[ing] 
in-depth cooperation with other countries along the Belt and Road in new generation information 
technology” (People’s Republic of China 2015). Subsequently, China’s 13th five-year plan 
published in 2016 called for the development of an “online Silk Road with Arab countries and 
others and accelerat[ing] the development of the China–ASEAN Information Harbor” and 
“establish[ing] open international communications facilities, refin[ing] the distribution of 
international networks, and improv[ing] cross-border land and submarine cable infrastructure” 
(People’s Republic of China 2016: 71). At the 2017 opening ceremony of the Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation, President Xi Jinping stated that China should “build the 
[BRI] into a road of innovation” and “innovation driven development” by intensifying cooperation 
in frontier areas and “turn them into a Digital Silk Road of the 21st century”. Areas highlighted by 
the president include the digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, quantum 
computing, cloud computing and smart cities (Shen 2018; Xinhuanet 2017). 
A forum dedicated to international cooperation along the Digital Silk Road was held in December 
2017 during the fourth World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, China. It was attended by 
high-ranking Chinese and foreign government officials (including President Xi Jinping), and 
executives from Google, Apple and Facebook despite their services being banned in China 
(China Daily 2017). At the forum, China announced a partnership with seven countries (Egypt, 
Laos, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates). Together the eight 
countries pledge to “expand broadband access and improve quality, promote a digital 
transformation, encourage e-commerce cooperation, support internet-based entrepreneurship 
and innovation, promote development of MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises), 
strengthen digital capability building, promote investment in the ICT sector, and promote inter-city 
cooperation of the digital economy… [and] enhance digital inclusion, encourage policy-making to 
create a transparent digital economy, promote cooperation in international standardization” 
(China.org.cn 2017). 
3.1 Drivers of the Digital Silk Road 
The scant literature on the Digital Silk Road identifies six major policy objectives: (1) addressing 
industrial overcapacity, (2) facilitating global expansion for Chinese corporations, (3) supporting 
the internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB), (4) constructing China-centred 
transnational networks, (5) promoting “inclusive globalisation”, and (6) promoting internet 
sovereignty. It is beyond the scope of this literature review to cover all of them in detail. Readers 
further interested in these drivers should see Shen (2018).   
Overcapacity 
China’s fibre-optic cable market’s overcapacity exceeded 50% in 2015 and is in urgent need of 
external markets. Chinese device manufacturers are also over-capacitated due to insufficient 
internal market demand. Shen (2018) argues that this led the CEO of ZTE – a Chinese 
Telecommunications equipment provider – to write in a Chinese communist party magazine 
asking for the “information Silk Road” to be expedited. Moreover, the BRI is also expected to 
increase demand for Chinese digital ICT products and services because non-digital infrastructure 
(e.g. railways, airports and pipelines) will need to be integrated which could further address ICT 
sector overcapacity (ibid.).  
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Relieving overcapacity for other sectors through e-commerce 
The Digital Silk Road also provides an opportunity to facilitate the expansion of e-commerce for 
other sectors of the Chinese economy like the steel industry, which saw the emergence of over 
200 online steel trading platforms between 2013 and 2016 allowing them to conduct business via 
e-commerce with customers further abroad. One steel-centred e-commerce company, 
Zhaogang.com, has set up branches across the BRI to help the export of excess capacity. Shen 
(2018) suggests that this partly explains why digital infrastructure is often built alongside 
transport and energy projects throughout the BRI.  
Enabling the “going out” of domestic firms 
In what is known as the “borrowing the boat to reach the sea” strategy, digital infrastructure in 
BRI countries and digital services (e.g. cloud services) provided by Chinese companies are 
expected to help Chinese firms reach external markets. Internet companies have been assigned 
a special role in China’s  “Internet +” policy which encourages Chinese internet firms to build 
competitive big data analytic and cloud computing applications and platforms to compliment 
traditional Chinese industries in international ventures (Shen 2018). Alibaba, for example, has 
expanded its data centres and Alibaba Cloud services overseas have been widely used by 
Chinese companies in their operations abroad helping them save on operational costs. Alibaba 
now seeks to expand its data centres to at least three countries covered by the BRI (India, 
Indonesia and Malaysia) (ibid.).  
Internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi  
The more general BRI literature identifies the internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi as a 
driver for the initiative overall and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the Silk Road Fund, and the New Development Bank (Rolland 2017). Until now, the 
exchange of data throughout the global financial system has been dominated by US-led or 
controlled institutions. The Digital Silk Road could help establish a transnational financial data 
network that gives China more authority, improves global circulation of the renminbi, and helps 
China circumvent external surveillance (Shen 2018). In 2015, the Cross-border Interbank 
Payment System went live which supports clearing and settlements service for international RMB 
payments and trade. It is seen as both an alternative and parallel to the US-centred SWIFT 
system (ibid.). One Chinese company, IZP Technologies, created “Globebill” a BRI-specific 
cross-border payment and settlement digital solution which aims to help “carry out direct 
liquidation between the Renminbi and other currencies, bypassing the U.S. Dollar as the 
intermediary” in up to 30 BRI countries and offers dual-currency credit cards in many countries 
(Shen 2018: 2690–2691).  
China-centred digital infrastructure  
Fibre-optic cables are susceptible to surveillance by the companies that control them or when 
they pass through foreign lands. Submarine cables transmit the majority of international data 
traffic. Today they are mainly geographically concentrated and dominated by “US [and European] 
Power” (Shen 2018). WikiLeaks uncovered that western spy agencies were tapping these cables 
for their global surveillance systems. To overcome the need to have their data travel through 
cables controlled by foreign powers, a Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 
fibre-optic cable was proposed, but was not implemented due to internal conflict between BRICS 
13 
countries and “domestic economic challenges”.  Shen (2018: 2691) suggests that through the 
Digital Silk Road, China aims to create its own “transnational network infrastructure through 
submarine, terrestrial, and satellite links, primarily alongside the Belt and Road Initiative 
countries”.  
Moreover, China seeks to expand its BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, a direct alternative to 
the US-based Global Positioning System (GPS). The government aimed to provide basic BeiDou 
navigation services to major BRI countries by 2018, and then expand globally by 2020 (Shen 
2018; State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2016). One of the main 
goals of the BeiDou system is to end military reliance on the US-centred GPS system in China in 
fear that the US could cut off China or its military from GPS during a dispute. China has already 
secured agreements with several BRI country governments to use the system in their 
government and military operations (Shen 2018; Wilson 2017).  
 “Inclusive globalisation” and repositioning China in a shifting geopolitical world  
Shen (2018) and many others argue that the BRI was formulated at an opportune moment for 
China. The Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and adopted 
an “America first” rhetoric. Amidst increasing global isolationism from the US, China has vowed 
to hold up global free trade and economic globalisation and to make it more “invigorated, 
inclusive, and sustainable” (Jinping 2017, emphasis added). In an article in an influential Chinese 
communist party journal, one Chinese International Relations scholar characterised the history of 
globalisation into three eras: globalisation 1.0, 2.0, and the current “Globalisation 3.0”. 
Globalisation 1.0 was underpinned by the ancient Silk Road, 2.0 was led by the western colonial 
and industrial powers, whilst the BRI is giving way for Globalisation 3.0 “with internet 
technologies such as big data and smart cities efficiently connecting landlocked and developing 
countries to the global economy through a more inclusive international trade and investment 
system” (Wang 2016 in Shen 2018: 2693). Digital technologies are thus viewed as empowering 
for landlocked states and developing nations and have been regarded as an important tool to be 
leveraged in China-led inclusive globalisation (ibid.). The electronic world trade platform (eWTP) 
– see Section 3.4 – was proposed by Alibaba founder Jack Ma on the backdrop that “the benefits 
of increased trade and globalisation have not reached smaller enterprises and developing 
countries as much as it has benefited their larger, more established counterparts” (Alibaba Group 
2016).  
Promoting internet sovereignty and spreading a “not free” internet 
China also seeks to expand its idea of “internet sovereignty”, a form of internet governance at 
odds with the Silicon Valley ideal of the internet as an open forum. At the 2017 World Internet 
Conference, Wang Huning, a prominent Chinese public official, said “China stands ready to 
develop new rules and systems of internet governance to serve all parties and counteract current 
imbalances” (Hornby 2017). Internet sovereignty suggests that the internet should be controlled 
by the state with each state having the right to regulate its own internet without foreign 
interference. Through internet sovereignty China defends its current practices of tight restrictions 
on connectivity with the rest of the world and seeks to help like-minded governments build similar 
architecture (ibid.). An internet based on these principles is especially attractive to governments 
seeking to curtail citizens from organising online dissent. It is thus not surprising that China’s 
selection of partners for the Digital Silk Road mainly includes countries where the internet is 
already quite restricted. Six of the eight partners (including China) score “Not Free” on the 
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Freedom on the Net index and the two others (Serbia and Laos) are not scored (Freedom House 
2017).  
China has ranked last on the Freedom on the Net index for three years in a row (ibid.). China has 
been found to shut down mobile services where it feels its central authority is being challenged 
including places where ethnic minorities and marginalised groups live (e.g. Tibet and the Uighur 
minority), and citizens criticising the government on foreign websites have received prison 
sentences of up to 11 years (ibid.). The Chinese government actively censors content regarding 
government criticism, corruption, conflict, political opposition, satire, social commentary, 
mobilisation for public causes, blasphemy, LGBTQI issues, and ethnic and religious minorities. 
This may be troublesome for achieving the SDGs since, as mentioned earlier, ethnic and 
religious minorities and the LGBTQI community have been found to be at risk of being left behind 
and such practices may effectively silence their voices (UNDP 2016).  
China’s system of online censorship has been called “the great firewall”. Thousands of foreign 
websites and services are blocked in the country including most Google services (e.g. search 
and Gmail), Dropbox, Facebook, live-streaming websites, gossip blogs, and news sites (The 
Economist 2018). Moreover, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) requires all 
companies operating locally to proactively censor material that “disturbs the economic or social 
order”, “endangers national honour”, or may contribute to the “overthrow of the socialist system”; 
and companies operating in China must comply with government orders to delete user posts and 
channels (Financial Times 2017). A recent Chinese cyber-security law requires that internet 
companies register users under their real names, store data about Chinese users within China, 
and comply with data requests from Chinese security agencies (Freedom House 2017). QQ and 
WeChat users can now be held responsible for any citizen dissent arising from discussions on 
groups they create even if they did not participate in the discussion (Human Rights Watch 2018). 
Along with promoting self-censorship in ways that disincentivises citizens from claiming their 
rights or fighting corruption, internet sovereignty has also meant censoring intellectual and 
academic content. Springer Nature was forced to pull 1,000 academic articles in China and 
300 articles have been blocked from China Quarterly, a high impact journal (Human Rights 
Watch 2018).  
There are already signs of these surveillance practices being exported and facilitated abroad by 
Chinese ICT companies. The Ethiopian government has actively restricted the “right to privacy 
and freedoms of expression and association, and access to information, among other rights” 
online (Human Rights Watch 2014: 2). ZSmart, a tool developed by ZTE – a Chinese state-
owned enterprise – has been in use in Ethiopia since 2009 and provides the government with 
information about each user (name, address and ethnicity), detailed call logs, SMS message 
content, and records phone calls from selected users. Moreover, ZTE’s “ZXMT” centralised 
monitoring system is capable of “intercepting web-based email, email accessed via client 
software (like Outlook), web browsing, and chat” (Human Rights Watch 2014: 62). It is 
understood that this system is automatically packaged into ZTE’s telecom equipment unless 
governments opt out. Moreover, content filtering and blocking is believed to be facilitated by 
Chinese technology and Human Rights Watch also suggests that ZTE provides surveillance 
technical assistance. The effective usage of these technologies by the Ethiopian government has 
resulted in Ethiopians feeling that government surveillance on digital channels is omnipresent, 
self-censoring themselves in fear of being arrested for “anti-government activities”. Ethiopian 
authorities use recorded mobile calls, call logs, and text and email gathered without a warrant as 
evidence in interrogations and in court. There have also been cases of Chinese technology used 
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to survey citizens in similar ways in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Gagliardone & Geall 2014). 
However, Human Rights Watch (2014) uncovered that European companies are also guilty of 
providing Ethiopian surveillance with products, services and expertise. 
Moreover, there are increasing fears that Chinese companies may use their infrastructure to aid 
the Chinese government’s intelligence efforts for traditional and economic espionage by including 
backdoors and vulnerabilities in ICT infrastructure that only they know about (Reed 2013). 
Huawei has positioned itself as a global leader in 5G technology and is seen as instrumental in 
implementing a China-led 5G standard. However, some governments have scrutinised the 
company recently due to its potential ties to the Chinese government and fears that the Chinese 
cybersecurity law would make ZTE and Huawei operations abroad subject to data sharing with 
the Communist Party for intelligence-gathering purposes. Consequently, the US and Australia 
have banned their equipment altogether whilst others such as Japan and the UK have 
contemplated doing so (Zolfagharifard 2018). Moreover, Huawei and ZTE are often given 
contracts to run the communications networks they build in countries with state-owned monopoly 
telecommunications companies (e.g. Ethiopia), giving them a panoptic view of digital activities 
and meaning all maintenance is done by the companies thus raising further cybersecurity risks 
(Reed 2013).  
3.2 Digital infrastructure 
Like many of the other activities carried out in the more general BRI, it can be challenging to 
define the parameters of the Digital Silk Road. This is a very light analysis of the initiative and 
does not claim to define or cover all its activities. Instead it will mainly cover six key areas that 
are regularly emphasised when the Digital Silk Road is mentioned and their potential implications 
for the SDGs: (1) digital infrastructure, (2) digital devices, (3) e-commerce, (4) smart cities and 
surveillance technologies, (5) the expansion of Chinese internet giants, and (6) the Digital Belt 
and Road Program Science Plan. At the time of writing, the Digital Silk Road had not yet been 
analysed from a development or SDG angle. The SDG links made in this section are made in 
relation to the more general ICT and SDG literature covered in Section 2 and is by no means 
conclusive or exhaustive. More work is needed to carry out an in-depth analysis of the 
interactions, synergies and trade-offs between the Digital Silk Road and the SDGs.  
Like other infrastructure activities in the BRI, there is no central database that neatly confirms 
which ICT infrastructure projects in BRI countries are linked to the initiative. At the moment, the 
best resource seems to be a slightly outdated UNESCAP (2017) study which notes recent, 
current, and planned terrestrial and submarine fibre-optic infrastructure passing through BRI 
countries, listed by corridors. However, it is unclear whether all the projects include Chinese 
involvement or have been branded under the BRI. Nonetheless, the report uncovered 13 major 
ICT infrastructure projects across six corridors. However, because of its emphasis on main 
corridors, it did not include African projects. Thus, an updated mapping of BRI-related ICT 
infrastructure projects – preferably in a living format – is warranted that follows up on projects 
identified by UNESCAP (2017) to confirm BRI alignment and seeks to include African projects. 
Another good resource is AidData.org’s “Mapping China’s Global Development Footprint” map4 
which geocodes Chinese-funded development projects and colour codes them by sector 
(including communications). However, the map is cluttered with many sectors (and thus colours), 
                                                   
4 https://www.aiddata.org/china-project-locations-v-1-0-1 
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and does not currently include a function that allows the isolation of single sectors making it 
difficult to make sense of investments in a single sector.  
Also, like other activities carried out as part of the BRI, this is not the first time Chinese 
companies have been involved in digital infrastructure construction activities abroad. Telecoms 
were a “core investment sector” in China’s previous “going out” strategy (Cisse 2012). Huawei’s 
involvement in African ICT infrastructure projects date back to 1998 when it began its first project 
in Kenya (Chang et al. 2009). As early as 2007, scholars had pointed out that “China’s 
concentrated investment in African telecommunication infrastructure has accelerated 
development to a degree that would be otherwise impossible” at a time when “Western nations 
[had] displayed particular hesitance to assist Africa’s telecom growth” (SIPA 2007). Chinese 
telecommunications companies had already supplied around 3 billion USD in ICT equipment to 
sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2007, mainly in Ethiopia, Ghana and Sudan (World Bank 
2009). One notable early ICT infrastructure project was the Ethiopia Millennium Project in which 
Chinese telecommunications company ZTE was the country’s “sole supplier” and aimed to build 
a fibre-optic transmission backbone and expand GSM mobile networks for the national monopoly 
mobile provider, Ethio Telecom (ZTE 2008). Chinese telecommunications companies have since 
continued to secure contracts to expand and upgrade infrastructure in Ethiopia including a 1.6 
billion USD project in 2013 split between ZTE and Huawei (Maasho 2013).  
Although Chinese ICT equipment companies had a late start compared to western companies, 
they now dominate the mobile infrastructure market and controlled over 40% of the market in 
2017. Huawei is now the biggest player in mobile infrastructure controlling 28% of the global 
market and ZTE the fourth biggest with 13% of the market (telecomlead 2018). The profile of 
Chinese ICT equipment firms is also rapidly improving in the submarine cable market. Huawei 
Marine launched in 2008 and has since emerged as one of the top suppliers in the world, 
accounting for the third most amount of systems installed between 2013 and 2017 and has the 
second most systems planned between 2018 and 2019 (Submarine Telecoms Forum 2017). One 
notable Huawei submarine fibre-optic project is the recently completed South Atlantic Inter Link 
(SAIL) cable, a 6,000km-long transatlantic cable linking Africa (Cameroon) with South America 
(Brazil) which directly connects the two continents for the first time (Huawei Marine 2018). 
Moreover, Huawei Marine also constructed the 1,300km-long Malaysia–Cambodia–Thailand 
(MCT) cable which gave Cambodia direct access to a submarine cable for the first time and 
improved connections in Malaysia and Thailand (Huawei Marine 2017). Huawei’s ascendance in 
the submarine fibre-optic market is unlikely to slow down in the near future. China is expected to 
nearly triple its share of global submarine cable projects from 7% between 2012 and 2015 to 
20% between 2016 and 2019 with over half of those cables being built beyond the South China 
Sea (Lee 2017). Moreover, two nascent Chinese companies – Hengton Group Co and ZTT 
Group – have also begun expanding their operations in the undersea cables market 
(Ecns.cn 2018). 
As mentioned earlier, ICT infrastructure has historically been built in places with buying-power 
deemed profitable by ICT companies meaning many rural, remote and poor areas have been left 
behind or experience less reliable connectivity. Most countries in Central Asia in particular have 
found it difficult to invest in or attract investment in digital infrastructure due to challenging 
geographical typology (e.g. deserts, mountainous terrain, and some countries being landlocked) 
combined with small populations scattered over large often rural and remote areas. Moreover, 
these countries also suffer from low international bandwidth, especially when measured in terms 
of speed per internet user (Kunavut et al. 2018). Digital infrastructure built as part of the Digital 
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Silk Road could thus help overcome this barrier and contribute to SDG 9.C by improving the 
availability and affordability of broadband networks and services for these countries and other 
BRI countries (ibid.).  
Submarine cables account for 90% of global internet traffic. Currently, digital networks spread 
from submarine cables in the sea that are connected to overland cables which thin out the further 
they get from the submarine cable, especially when traversing countries that have limited 
fibre-optic interconnections and international gateways. Digital connectivity has been identified as 
a potential route to integration into globalisation for landlocked developing countries. For these 
countries, internet access is hindered by insufficient bandwidth and accessing international links 
which requires connecting to neighbouring countries and can be costly due to high transit costs 
(Kunavut et al. 2018). Landlocked countries often rely on a few outdated terrestrial connections 
to neighbouring countries with access to regional and global cable systems. Consequently, 
landlocked countries tend to have more expensive and slower internet connections. These costs 
have been identified as a barrier to e-commerce and the use of the internet by SMEs in the 
region (ibid.).  
The growth of global Chinese telecommunications companies may be especially beneficial for 
developing countries. Huawei has historically offered ICT equipment 5–15% cheaper than 
equipment providers from western countries without compromising quality while ZTE has offered 
equipment up to 30–40% cheaper (Chang et al. 2009; Cisse 2012). Moreover, in line with 
China’s non-interference policy, Huawei and ZTE have been known to take risks in countries and 
environments that Western suppliers often shy away from (Cisse 2012). The relative low cost of 
Huawei and ZTE equipment has raised suspicions amongst foreign companies and governments 
regarding unfair  subsidies provided by the Chinese government that provide the companies with 
an unfair advantage in global markets (Financial Times 2014).  
Nonetheless, Chinese ICT infrastructure is helping connect Africa. Chinese funding for ICT 
infrastructure routinely rivals and often surpasses all members of the Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa (ICA) countries combined – which include all the G8 countries plus South Korea – 
making Chinese ICT companies the most significant foreign players in African digital 
infrastructure (see Figure 1) (ICA 2017). “China has made inroads into the emerging 
telecommunications market in Africa through a mixture of loans, which are part of aid packages, 
and export credits, which are used to foster Chinese investment by offering resources to Chinese 
companies willing to invest in African markets” (Gagliardone & Geall 2014: 3). Chinese ICT 
infrastructure funding typically comes in the form of loans financed by the Export–Import Bank of 
China and the China Development Bank, which require equipment to be purchased from Chinese 







Figure 1: Total African ICT infrastructure financing by source, 2013–2017 (in millions USD) 
 
Source: Adapted from ICA (2017: 85) and https://www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/ict/ict-financing-trends/  
However, whether this access will be universal as the SDG target calls for remains to be seen. 
Although China’s 13th five-year plan promises 98% internet coverage in China, similar promises 
have not been made for BRI countries (People’s Republic of China 2016). Given that the project 
is driven by China and Chinese company interests – as shown in Section 3.1 – it may be likely 
that Digital Silk Road projects prioritise building infrastructure in areas that are of geopolitical 
significance or help them best achieve their objectives rather than reach the most underserved 
areas. Scholars have argued that this has historically been the case with Chinese ICT suppliers 
operating in Africa as they have been heavily supported by the government through diplomatic 
and financial support (Cisse 2012). Although this may mean areas that were previously seen as 
unprofitable by western ICT equipment companies may be prioritised, already unconnected 
areas in BRI countries without strategic significance may be left further behind (LNOB goal) if 
others do not step up to build the infrastructure.  
Fortunately, Huawei, the biggest Chinese ICT infrastructure supplier, has made clear efforts to 
align itself with the SDGs as well as the BRI. The company asserts that “[their] corporate mission 
is to bring digital to every person, home and organization for a fully connected, intelligent world, 
[they] believe that ICT is a critical contributor and enabler of [the] UN’s SDGs, helping to quicken 
their reach and achievement”.5 The company publishes an annual ICT SDG Benchmark report 
that seeks to examine the degree to which ICTs enable the SDGs in 49 countries. In these 
reports, Huawei argues that ICTs have the highest potential to positively impact six SDGs based 
on the strength of correlations between ICT adoption and improvement in the relevant goal: 
SDG 4 (quality education); SDG 3 (good health and wellbeing); SDG 9 (industry, innovation and 
infrastructure); SDG 5 (gender equality); SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities); and 
SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) (Huawei 2018).  
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However, the Huawei (2018) report is blind to the potential challenges ICTs pose to achieving the 
SDGs covered in Section 2 of this report. In the opening sentences of the executive summary, 
Huawei (2018: 5) asserts that “Information Communication Technology (ICT) is a force for good. 
By providing access to information, it makes people more effective and businesses more 
efficient. Access to ICT can help society build a more equitable, sustainable world”. However, as 
the ICT and SDG literature shows, although ICTs can help achieve positive impacts, the 
relationship between the two is complex, not certain and may run counter to the SDGs if 
appropriate actions are not taken (Unwin 2017). The Huawei (2018) report also suggests that 
ICT development is strongly correlated “with faster and more efficient progress on the SDGs”, 
making “ICT a leading indicator for sustainable development”. Their ICT score depends on three 
factors: “access”, “digital skills”, and “use”, all of which Huawei points out are strongly correlated 
to the SDGs on their own. Similar to logical leaps that suggest that correlation between economic 
growth and ICT adoption is causal highlighted by Galperin & Viecens (2017), the Huawei 
(2018: 6) report claims that “SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being) and SDG 4 (Quality 
Education) showed the highest level of correlation with ICT, suggesting that this is where digital 
technology has the highest potential to accelerate country performance and that this is especially 
true for Pioneer and Up-and-Comer countries, where small investments in ICT are coupled with 
significant SDG gains”. The report also highlights correlations between its ICT SDG Benchmark 
with the triple bottom line – GDP, the Human Development Index and Environmental 
Performance Index. However, as the literature exploring the relationship between economic 
growth and ICT adoption shows, that two indices are correlated does not tell us the presence or 
direction of causality (Galperin & Viecens 2017). The report is full of Preston curves suggesting 
that a small increase in ICT adoption leads to significant development gains. However, the 
inability to prove causality from Preston curves has long been acknowledged (Bloom & Canning 
2007). There is a risk that these claims just fuel the false pretence on which the African ICT 
policies analysed by Friederici et al. (2017) are based in which ICTs are largely promoted as an 
end in themselves without evidence.  
One thing the Huawei (2018) report does well is highlight that an uneven spread of digital 
technologies could lead to exacerbating inequalities between women and men, developing and 
developed countries, and between those without and with digital skills. However, Huawei does 
not seem to acknowledge the potential for ICTs to move us away from achieving the SDGs rather 
than toward them. In fact the report (Huawei 2018) may be guilty of promoting digitisation 
prematurely when it urges the public sector to digitise its processes and fully embrace 
e-government services suggesting that this would not only “improve the quality and effectiveness 
of public services, but they would also free up significant resources to invest in healthcare, 
education and other major areas key to societal well-being”. However, as mentioned in 
Section 2.3.1, the United Nations’ (2018) latest e-government survey warned that if governments 
prematurely turn to “digital first” and “digital by default” strategies whilst people remain offline, 
this can contribute to the offline populations falling further behind (LNOB goal). Instead of a 
sincere report about achieving the SDGs, the text reads more like a marketing/public relations 
attempt to SDG-wash their activities. In its next report, the company should include ways in 
which it will work with others to mitigate the potential challenges posed by ICTs.  
Furthermore, Huawei (2018) pushes forward the need to build more data centres without any 
mention of their energy consumption implications or the need for them to run on green energy. 
The only mention of energy efficiency is about how utilising cloud services offers environmental 
benefits in the form of increased energy efficiency and improved processes. However, as Unwin 
(2017) and Greenpeace (2017a) argue, although the ICT sector helps unload emissions from 
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other sectors across the economy, this has also meant that the ICT sector is now consuming 
more electricity and emitting more greenhouse gases and it is still unclear whether the ICT sector 
will have a net positive or negative impact on the environment. The Huawei (2018: 31) report 
passively mentions that mobile phones are “creating enormous problems and opportunities as 
well. We face a staggering 50 million tons of e-waste every year”, but these sentences were 
written in a short box written by staff from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the point is not raised again. Ironically, waste generated per capita was one of the indicators 
it used to measure the ICT score correlation with SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities) 
and renewable energy consumption as a percentage of total energy consumption was used for 
SDG 7, but Huawei did not seem ready to acknowledge that it too may be a source of waste and 
energy consumption. As mentioned earlier, networks – Huawei’s core business – was highlighted 
as the biggest electricity-consuming sub-component of the IT sector and the share of energy 
consumed by networks has grown in recent years thanks to an explosion of data (Greenpeace 
2017a). Moreover, the other major energy-consuming activities of the IT sector (data centres, 
devices and manufacturing) are also all areas in which Huawei operates. For digital infrastructure 
in the BRI to contribute to a more sustainable environment rather than detract to it, Huawei 
needs to more openly link its efforts to improve SDG outcomes to the ICT equipment sector’s 
ecological footprint. The authors of the journal article projecting future ICT sector emissions, 
Andrae & Edler (2015), were Huawei employees – albeit from their Swedish subsidiary – thus it 
must be on the company’s radar. Furthermore, the company publishes an annual sustainability 
report and the latest edition illustrates the steps it is taking to make its operations greener and 
more sustainable and includes a page dedicated to “green operations” (Huawei 2017). However, 
a more honest and holistic SDG report is warranted from the world’s biggest ICT equipment 
company. 
Moreover, although Huawei (2018) makes a strong case for expanding digital infrastructure and 
also acknowledges that access is not sufficient on its own but that digital skills and effective use 
are also necessary, it is unclear what steps it will take to tackle the multidimensional digital 
inequalities and barriers covered in Section 2. As Unwin (2017) argues, along with universal 
provision of digital connectivity, for ICTs to empower marginalised groups, they need to be aware 
about these technologies and how they could be leveraged in ways to extract value across the 
SDGs, have appropriate skill levels to leverage ICTs, be able to afford digital technologies and 
have content that is relevant to experience in the languages that they speak and in formats that 
they can access. This does not mean, however, that Chinese actors should go at this alone. As 
mentioned in Section 2, many factors need to be considered and coordinated including 
“government policies and actions, infrastructure investment, applications and content, markets 
and competition, government budgets, and ICT skills and education”, (Sharafat & Lehr 2017: 30). 
Taking into account the complexity of the interaction between ICTs and the SDGs, governments, 
businesses, civil society, citizens and development actors will need to look beyond targets and 
plans for ICT-specific SDG goals and targets identified in the beginning of this section and 
consider how ICTs can contribute – both positively and negatively – to all the other SDGs and set 
targets accordingly if ICTs are to have a net positive impact on the achievement of the SDGs 
(Unwin 2017). Given their big and ever-increasing role in digital infrastructure, Chinese ICT 
equipment suppliers must be brought into any partnership seeking to ensure ICTs enable SDG 
achievement.  
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3.3 Expanding markets for Chinese mobile device makers 
ICT infrastructure is not very useful without devices to connect to it. The profile of Chinese device 
manufacturers has also been on the rise. Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, and Lenovo now occupy the 
third, fourth, fifth and seventh spots in global mobile device market share (see Figure 2). All four 
companies have reached there in only a short amount of time. Huawei appeared in the top 10 for 
the first time in 2015 and three other companies still did not appear (see Figure 3).  
Figure 2: Mobile vendor market share worldwide, August 2017–August 2018 
 
Source: http://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/worldwide/#monthly-201708-201808-bar under Creative 
Commons Attribution-share Alike 3.0 Unported License 
Figure 3: Mobile vendor market share worldwide, 2015 
 
Source: http://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/worldwide/#yearly-2015-2015-bar under Creative Commons 
Attribution-share Alike 3.0 Unported License 
Chinese smartphone manufacturer Transsion owns several brands including Tecno, Infinix, and 
Itel amongst others and has appropriated a large share of the market in Africa. The company first 
opened a factory in Ethiopia in 2011 and has since focused on tailoring its products to African 
consumers by “working closely with research and development centers in Nigeria and Kenya, 
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and providing affordable and region-specific phones (ranging from 10 to 400 USD) to cities and 
rural Africa” (Dahir 2018). Some of its phones include features that cater to the needs of local 
people including multiple SIM slots, long battery life, FM radio, anti-oil fingerprint (to withstand 
bad weather), camera exposures calibrated to darker skin tones, and that run in local languages 
such as Amharic and Swahili. Thus, it seems Transsion is contributing to SDG 9.B by “supporting 
domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries”. 
Transsion Holdings surpassed Samsung in African market share in 2017 when all its brands are 
combined (see Figure 4). Moreover, Transsion brands itel and Tecno dominate the African 
feature phone market (see Figure 5) (Dahir 2018). Thanks in large part to Transsion, the share of 
smartphones sold in Africa declined from 2016 to 2017 while feature phones increased to 61% 
up from 55% in 2016 (Sadeque 2018). Although Transsion’s feature phones may be digitally 
including people for the first time, the digital inequalities literature warns that although an 
increase in feature phone ownership may decrease the absolute divide between those with and 
without devices, digital divides are multidimensional and there is a risk that relative divides 
increase between feature phone owners, smartphone owners, and people who may have access 
to multiple digital devices (e.g. smartphone and a PC). This may have implications for SDG 10 on 
reducing inequalities.  Although feature phone functionality has increased substantially, they are 
limited in the apps and functions they support and are much slower and less powerful than 
smartphones. Differing functionalities and capabilities between feature phones and smartphones 
as well as differing user ability to use a smartphone effectively is leading to “smartphone divide” 
“based on a user’s ability to access and use [and benefit from] an array of different services” (Lee 
& Park 2015: 81). Thus, if a large proportion of new mobile owners in BRI countries only use 
feature phones and do not eventually upgrade to smartphones or do so only much later in the 
future, this trend could risk leaving feature phone users behind relative to smartphone users 
(LNOB goal).  
Figure 4: Transsion smartphones overtook Samsung in Africa in 2017  
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Figure 5: Transsion brands dominate Africa’s feature mobile phone market 
 
Source: Based on IDC Worldwide data. https://www.theatlas.com/charts/Hk8pyCxwG 
There are sustainability concerns surrounding Chinese device manufacturers. In 2017, Huawei 
was found to be the only top three device manufacturer to not report on its supply chain or its 
emissions and “has yet to set any goal to transition its supply chain to renewable energy” 
(Greenpeace 2017b: 13). The emerging Chinese smartphone manufacturers Oppo, Vivo and 
Xiaomi were also found to lack transparency meaning the carbon emissions of their supply 
chains remain hidden from public view. All four manufacturers ranked poorly on Greenpeace’s 
(2017b) Green Electronics company report card which scores companies in three main areas: 
dirty energy consumption, resource intensity, and harmful chemicals contained in products. 
Transsion’s brands were not included in the assessment. Greenpeace (2017b) finds that 
although they tend to score better on average, several western manufacturers are also guilty of 
not taking adequate measures to protect the planet’s ecosystem. Device manufacturers as a 
whole should work together to set green energy targets and increase their transparency. 
Greenpeace (2017a) showed that device manufacturers emit a significant 34% of the IT sector’s 
emissions.  
As mentioned in Section 2, mobile phone e-waste often ends up dumped in developing countries 
where harmful chemicals can negatively affect the health of waste pickers and mobile recyclers 
(Perkins et al. 2014). Although the threshold is not known, Huawei has set restrictions on 
acceptable levels of some of these harmful chemicals but still lags behind Apple and Google, 
which have eliminated these chemicals altogether (Greenpeace 2017b). Oppo, Vivo and Xiaomi 
scored poorly regarding chemicals. If Chinese device manufacturers – and others – do not 
remove these chemicals and reduce e-waste, their activities may detract from our ability to 
achieve SDG 3 (Health and Well-being). Solving these issues will likely become more important 
as more people gain access to phones and Chinese device manufacturers continue to increase 
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Moreover, Amnesty International (2016) has called out Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo, and western ICT 
companies for not taking adequate actions to ensure that the cobalt used to make the lithium ion 
batteries in their products do not depend on children working in hazardous conditions, forced 
labour, or human rights violations. SDG 8.7 calls for “immediate and effective measures to 
eradicate forced labour... and elimination of the worst forms of child labour”. Thus a failure to get 
these Chinese companies and others in the device manufacturing industry onboard may hinder 
our ability to achieve SDG 8 on decent work for all.  
3.4 The expansion of Chinese internet companies on the BRI 
Although the BRI was first announced in 2013 and Huawei and ZTE had been involved in 
international ICT infrastructure projects abroad for decades, the Chinese government did not 
incentivise or promote the global expansion of Chinese internet companies more generally until 
2015 (Lee 2017). That year, the Chinese government urged its internet companies to get 
involved in building a “Digital Silk Road, a Silk Road in cyberspace” to “expand e-commerce, 
industrial networks, and internet banking abroad” (Huanxin 2015). Chinese internet companies 
have quickly embraced the initiative and have expanded their influence. Shen (2018) suggests 
that Chinese companies have responded by aligning their international efforts to the BRI in order 
to get government blessing, funding, and diplomatic and political support.  
The technology, media and telecommunications sector has outperformed all other sectors in 
attracting Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2016 and 2017 in volume with 340 disclosed 
merger and acquisition (M&A) deals worth 71.2 billion USD (Ernst & Young 2018).6 Alibaba has 
been buying majority shares of e-commerce companies across the BRI countries including but 
not limited to PT.Tokopedia in Indonesia, Trendyol in Turkey, Lazada in Singapore (which also 
serves Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), and Daraz.pk in Pakistan, 
which also operates in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal (Chou 2018; Ernst & Young 
2018; Russell 2018; Xinhua 2017). Moreover, the Alibaba Group’s main domestic competitor, 
Tencent, which owns WeChat and JD.com, has also been busy acquiring stakes in firms across 
the BRI countries.  
Alibaba and Tencent have been investing in a diverse set of areas including electric vehicles, 
bike-sharing services, e-commerce, electronic payment systems (fintech), social media, 
messaging apps, online gaming, music streaming services, ride-sharing apps, and more. 
Between 2008 and 2017, Alibaba and Tencent combined for over 65 billion USD in investments 
in foreign firms with much of the value invested from 2015. This has occurred in parallel to a 
general decrease of 30% in overall Chinese M&A as the government has become wary of some 
of the acquisitions that it believes do not align with China’s strategic interests, showing that 
China’ s technology sector is seen as an essential player in the BRI and China’s geopolitical and 
geoeconomic interests (Lucas 2017). The Asia and Pacific region accounts for over 80% and 
70% of Alibaba’s and Tencent’s foreign M&A activity respectively. These M&As seem to be 
strongly aligned with the BRI as a majority of them have occurred in the Asia and Pacific region – 
often under a BRI banner (Sender 2018).  
Alibaba and Tencent have been investing in the region amidst a lack of local venture capital and 
angel investment funds, which entrepreneurs can tap into. Thus, these investments may be well 
aligned with SDG 8.3, which calls for encouraging the growth of SMEs through access to finance. 
                                                   
6 This figure includes data for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
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However, there are growing concerns that the two companies have become too powerful in Asia 
and that because they are often the only two funders, that refusing their money could put 
entrepreneurs in a tricky position (ibid.). Moreover, there is growing concern that consumer data 
in Chinese acquired firms may not be safe given the Chinese cybersecurity law mandating 
Chinese companies to comply and assist with state intelligence-gathering missions (Mozur 
2018). There are also environmental concerns about the operations of the big Chinese internet 
companies. Greenpeace (2017b) showed that two thirds of the electricity supply for the big three 
Chinese IT companies (Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent) currently comes from coal with all three 
companies scoring an “F” in energy transparency and commitment to renewable energy.  
3.5 Promoting “inclusive globalisation” through e-commerce 
In late 2016, Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba’s founder, Jack Ma introduced his idea of an 
electronic world trade platform (eWTP) and aligned it with the BRI. Ma said this initiative will “pay 
special attention to the OBOR [One Belt One Road] strategy and execution, [he] thinks with 
eWTP, we can make OBOR, more lovely” (Ma 2017). Ma envisions that the eWTP will work 
complementarily to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whilst the WTO is mainly the realm of 
states, multinationals and big business, the eWTP is meant to be a business-driven platform 
(with government support) for SMEs and aims to help them “overcome complex regulations, 
processes and barriers that hinder their participation in global commerce” (Alibaba Group 2016). 
To achieve this, the eWTP also aims to support the creation of eHubs, or “Digital Free Trade 
Zones” (DFTZ). 
Whereas traditional duty-free zones act as physical areas where goods can be imported, further 
processed, and re-exported without paying duties and have mostly been used by big businesses, 
the DFTZs will offer services tailored to SMEs to help them access international markets in a 
similar fashion and provide them with quick clearance and access to improved internet-enabled 
logistics (Alibaba Group 2016; Yean 2018). The first DFTZ was launched in Malaysia in 
November 2017 by Alibaba and the Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (MDEC) with the aim 
to “connect Malaysia’s SMEs globally through Alibaba-inspired electronic world trade platforms 
that are being established to support greater exchange between BRI countries” (Rastogi 2018; 
Yean 2018: 1). The Malaysian DFTZ has three main components: (i) an e-fulfilment hub serving 
as a centralised aviation, air cargo, and logistics facility seeking to speed up both the process for 
SMEs to secure export clearance on customs and cargo as well as Cargo Terminal Operations; 
(ii) a satellite hub in Kuala Lumpur offering a range of facilities including digitally connected 
physical showrooms and training centres; and (iii) an e-services platform which offers integrated 
e-services to businesses including cross-border trade advisory, end-to-end business support for 
cross-border e-commerce, and market access to exporters and importers (MITI 2018; Rastogi 
2018). SMEs in the DFTZ will also gain access to Alibaba’s OneTouch e-services platform, and 
be able sell to China via Alibaba and its subsidiary marketplaces (Rastogi 2018). Alibaba 
Group’s, Ant Financial has signed agreements with two Malaysian financial service providers to 
offer its mobile digital wallet (Alipay) to SMEs. Furthermore, Alibaba Cloud is also establishing a 
data centre in Malaysia (Yean 2018).  
Because the initiative is relatively new, there is not much literature on its rationale. Jack Ma gave 
a speech at Alibaba’s office launch in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia that serves as a good reference 
point. In it, he frames the eWTP as a “WWW” (Win-Win-Win) and about a new era of 
globalisation. In his speech he elaborates:  
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The first win should be given to your customers… the second win is for the partners and 
the third win is for yourself…. The difference between our model and the American model 
or traditional globalised model is we come here looking for partners. We come here to 
enable partners. We want the partners to be local king here, because we know only when 
partners succeed, we can be successful so we come here to work with Malaysian young 
people... so that they can go out globally with us. By supporting young Malaysian people, 
Malaysian young people will support Alibaba going global… I am a 100% believer of 
globalisation... but globalisation needs to be improved. In the past 30 years, the 
globalisation of global trade was controlled by 60,000 big companies. If we can support 
16 million small businesses around the world so they can do business, I think that is 
called inclusive globalisation. That is the future. That is the hope of sustainable economy. 
In the future it will not be called e-commerce, it will be called e-business. Eighty per cent 
of small business[es] will be online and 80% of small business will be global. If they do 
not think global there will be no future for them if you only sell your products in your town 
you will never survive (Ma 2018b).  
However, it is unclear how inclusive the eWTP and DFTZs will actually be. Yean (2018) suggests 
incentives to increase imports through e-commerce may negatively impact domestic producers 
and that not all SMEs are well placed to equally benefit from e-commerce platforms since it 
requires export strategies and understanding regulatory regimes and documentation for both 
Malaysia and importing countries. Moreover, nearly 90% of businesses in Malaysia are SMEs but 
only 28% of SMEs have an online presence and only 15% already export (Yean 2018). As 
mentioned in Section 2, this is a trend that is replicated across countries. Small businesses are 
less likely than larger ones to be online or receive orders over the internet (UNCTAD 2017). Only 
time will tell whether the DFTZ will help narrow this gap in Malaysia and in other places that 
adopt them. If successful, the initiative can have positive implications on SDG 8.3 which calls for 
“Promoting development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, 
entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalisation and growth of 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services”, as 
well as SDG 9.3 which calls for “Increasing the access of small-scale industrial and other 
enterprises… and their integration into value chains and markets”.   
However, early adoption of the Malaysian DFTZ seems to mirror digital inequalities between 
SMEs rather than overcome them. As of March 2018, 2,072 Malaysian SMEs were registered on 
the platform. Three states (out of 13) accounted for 69% of SMEs participating (Yean 2018). 
Moreover, registration has not necessarily led to usage. “Malaysian SMEs that were already 
listed on Alibaba before the establishment of the DFTZ… appear [to] not have necessarily been 
using the platform for exports, but for prestige [especially] Gold members. SMEs in general lack 
understanding of ecommerce, and lack competent personnel to conduct ecommerce activities 
and market goods and services” (Yean 2018: 5). Digital capacity disparities between firms may 
lead many SMEs to be passive exporters on the platform waiting for buyers to discover them. 
Taking full advantage of the initiative will require SMEs to be capable of researching their 
competitors’ products and pricing strategies and respond by repositioning products and finding 
buyers rather than waiting to be found (ibid.). Moreover, although the DFTZ expedites the 
process of obtaining documentation, SMEs will have to obtain these documents on their own and 
SMEs are likely to have varying levels of knowledge and ability to comply with foreign rules and 
regulations (ibid.). It is also unclear if SMEs’ engagement will sustain after government financial 
assistance ends especially if benefits do not materialise as envisioned. If actions are not taken to 
27 
reverse these trends, Ma’s vision of a future where small businesses fail if they do not go online 
and go global may lead to offline and remote SMEs falling further behind.  
Ma also envisions a future in which there will be no “made in China” or “America”, but everything 
will be “made in the internet” and there will be no more B2C (Business to Consumer), but instead 
C2B (Customer to Business) because everything will be tailor-made (Ma 2018b). In Ma’s vision, 
international trade will no longer be shipped via large containers but instead:  
It will go through packages... 8 years ago China had only less than 80,000 packages 
delivered on the street. This year China will create more than 50 billion. So this number 
alone, China alone is bigger than the rest of the world combined. That is because of 
internet. That is because of e-commerce. That is because of C2B (Ma 2018b). 
However, a similar scale of packaging growth across the BRI will necessarily come with 
environmental implications if packaging is not fully recyclable and recycled. The Chinese 
government is currently struggling to deal with the tonnes of wastage that the e-commerce boom 
is creating in its cities. “The combined length of packing tape used by China in 2015 could circle 
the equator 425 times” and only an estimated 20% of Chinese packaging is recycled (Luo 2017). 
Moreover, the packaging often contains hazardous chemicals that could pose risks to human 
health (ibid.). If other countries are to replicate China’s e-commerce boom, more sustainable 
practices will be needed as the proliferation of packaging is likely to have implications for 
SDG 12.5 on reducing “waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse” and 
SDG 12.4 on “achieving the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes 
throughout their life cycle… in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the 
environment”. Moreover, Ma’s idea of a prosperous future for SMEs tends to imply that more 
consumerism and waste generation will fuel economic growth and stands in contrast to SDG 8.4 
calling for a decoupling of economic growth from environmental degradation. 
3.6 Smart cities 
Silk Road (China Daily 2017). According to HSBC (2018), “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
is paving the way for a new iteration of cities throughout Asia. Dubbed ‘smart cities’, new urban 
areas are being constructed which utilise advanced information and communication technologies 
(ICT), the internet of things, and other high-tech strategies to integrate municipal services, 
monitor traffic and pollution, facilitate ecological waste management, streamline public facilities 
such as hospitals, limit energy usage, and, ultimately, make cities more efficient, clean, and 
safe.” 
China is now home to half of the over 1,000 smart city pilots with around 100 new smart cities 
planned between 2016 to 2020 (Deloitte 2018). It is thus no surprise that China is exporting 
smart city technologies. Notable BRI smart city projects according to HSBC (2018) include the 
New Manila Bay City of Pearl, the biggest BRI project in the Philippines; and the “China Smart 
Creation (CSC) Smart Eco-Valley in Betong”, a joint venture between 10 Chinese companies and 
two Malaysian developers including “hotels, universities, ‘smart’ factories, and state-of-the-art 
housing and will receive its technology directly from China”.   
At its core, a smart city is the physical digital integration of a cities system and its citizens. Smart 
cities generally seek to digitally interconnect and integrate services within a city to provide more 
efficient services by better anticipating demand and decreasing waste and pollution. In other 
words, smart cities aim to improve the functioning of a city to make it more sustainable, efficient, 
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and livable (Suzuki 2017). As a greater percentage of the global population move into cities, 
making cities smarter may become a necessity for sustainable development. Smart cities could 
positively contribute to several SDGs including but not limited to: SDG 3 (good health and 
wellbeing); SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation); SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities); 
and SDG 13 (climate action).   
Although there is general agreement that smart cities must include systems, people and 
information, there is no widely accepted view of what a smart city should look like in practice. 
At one end of the spectrum governments and technology companies may infuse predefined 
technocratic systems into the city without consulting citizens about what is important to them. 
At the other end there are bottom-up community-led approaches where citizens are directly 
involved in deciding what data is collected and for what purposes and sometimes involved in the 
data collection itself. Suzuki (2017) argues that what makes a city smart varies from context to 
context depending on what citizens of the city see as important and valuable. Until now “smart 
cities have been mainly designed as centralized top-down projects led by corporations, which put 
municipalities under pressure to deploy their projects and in which citizens appear at best as 
consumers”. This also seems to be the case with Chinese smart cities. Chandrasekar et al. 
(2016: 9) found that “China follows the traditional ‘top down’ approach with each city having its 
own smart leadership group with formal leadership structures… [and] [o]ne of the main 
challenges is engaging with community stakeholders”.  
Suzuki (2017) emphasises that although smart cities do provide potential to improve 
development outcomes, smart cities should be made “for people” and that technology should 
only be an enabler. Specifically, she recommends that people seeking to implement smart city 
solutions ask themselves “Smart cities to whom?” Because the decisions made by smart city 
platforms are based on data, these will only be as good as the data that goes into them and can 
potentially be biased. Better-connected citizens may generate more data than unconnected 
citizens. Given that women, children, disabled people, minorities, and the elderly are 
disproportionately less likely to be as connected, this may lead to cities that underserve their 
needs or do not take into account their “rights, needs, expectations, and inclusion”. According to 
Chandrasekar et al. (2016: 9) this seems to currently be the case in China where “City 
governments need to overcome the risk of marginalising services only to affluent sections of the 
community who own smartphones. As a vast segment of the community will not have access to 
smartphones and other mobile technologies, provision should be made for a multi-channel 
strategy.” This can be troublesome since unconnected groups already tend to be underserved. If 
smart cities disproportionately serve the interests of elites and the better off, this may potentially 
hinder achievement of SDG 10 on reducing inequality and create new forms of discrimination 
and poverty, limiting our ability to achieve SDG 5 on “gender equality and empowering women 
and girls” as well as the overarching goal of LNOB. Thus, we must ensure that smart cities built 
as part of the BRI include the voices of the unconnected and that being smart does not equate to 
over-relying on technology that the poor and marginalised do not have access to.   
Suzuki (2017) warns that collecting the wrong data and using the wrong technologies may result 
in problematic smart cities. The western media and activists have grown weary of surveillance 
technology, which is increasingly linked to the BRI. “Smart cities” in China are often replete with 
CCTV cameras which, with the aid of facial recognition software, artificial intelligence, and 
biometric national IDs can keep tabs on Chinese citizens (Mozur 2018). Huawei, for example, 
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brands the bundling of smart city and surveillance technology as “safe city solutions”.7 In 
Shenzhen, there are reports that this surveillance apparatus is being used to issue fines for 
jaywalking and publicly naming and shaming jaywalkers on large screens on public crossings 
and a government website (Baynes 2018).  Moreover, the government plans to introduce a 
mandatory social credit rating system by 2020 – already under pilot for millions of people – in 
which surveillance data, social media data, and data from elsewhere will be combined to rate 
citizens with potential impacts on their abilities to have their children go to a good school, get a 
good job, stay at a good hotel, take the train, and even slowing down the internet speed of the 
“bad citizen”. On the other hand, “good citizens” may get energy bill discounts, better interest 
rates, and get their profiles boosted on dating apps (Ma 2018a). The potential implications of this 
system on the SDGs (especially SDG 10 on reducing inequalities) and the overarching goal of 
leaving no one behind need to be looked into.   
There are already signs that some elements of safe city technology are being exported through 
the BRI. A Chinese company signed a deal with the Zimbabwean government to implement a 
mass facial recognition project and “help the government build a smart financial service network 
as well as introduce intelligent security applications at airports, railway stations and bus stations” 
(Global Times 2018). Moreover, the company seeks to use the BRI as an opportunity to improve 
its software algorithm’s ability to recognise darker skin tones, which has been a challenge for 
facial recognition software to date. The data generated by this surveillance system, which was 
made without citizen consent and is mainly based on pictures of people’s faces and bodies, will 
be sent to China as part of the deal and will likely give the Chinese company involved an edge 
when scaling out to other African countries (Hawkins 2018). Global Times (2018), a Chinese 
newspaper focusing on international relations issues from the government’s perspective, 
suggests that “this Chinese AI Industry project in Africa could contribute to the economic 
development and technology sharing in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative and realize 
the win-win goal of economic benefits”.  
Whereas the Chinese and Zimbabwean government may present this as a system that can help 
tackle “social security issues, including robberies and shootings”, others feel the technology will 
be mainly used to control people’s freedoms and further crack down on dissenting voices in a 
country with a long history of government repressing freedom of expression including with the 
use of other surveillance technologies (Hawkins 2018). This issue is not unique to Chinese 
companies. One of three surveillance technology exports by European companies between 2014 
and 2016 was found to be exported to countries where the internet is “not free” (Gjerding & Skou 
Andersen 2017). Rather than simply cracking down on Chinese companies exporting 
surveillance technologies under the BRI, overcoming the issue of what happens with surveillance 
technology once it is exported will require international collaboration. Although the SDGs are 
grounded in human rights, ambiguity in the language of the SDGs make them inadequate to 
criticise increased surveillance and the potential for it to be used in ways that limit civil liberties 
and undermine human rights. Privacy International (2017) research shows “that the fears of the 
growing scope of ID, including when tied to biometric technologies such as facial recognition, can 
give governments the potential for unprecedented control and monitoring over populations” and 
thus risks human rights violations and becoming disempowering for citizens. This could prove to 
be one of the SDGs’ biggest shortcomings if Chinese – and Western – surveillance companies 
                                                   
7 https://e.huawei.com/ae/solutions/industries/public-safety/safe-city/safe-city 
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are able to provide equipment to governments with negative intentions that they actively use to 
suppress rights of groups already at risk of being left behind.  
3.7 The Digital Belt and Road Program Science Plan  
The Digital Belt and Road Program Science Plan is a science diplomacy initiative between 
Chinese scientists and experts from 19 countries and seven international organisations that is 
directly linked to the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. It seeks to “share expertise, knowledge, 
technologies and data to demonstrate the significance of Earth Observation Science and 
Technology and Big Earth Data applications for large-scale sustainable development projects” 
(Digital Belt and Road 2017: 1). The programme calls for leveraging of big Earth data8 in the 
design, development and implementation of a diverse range of projects including infrastructure, 
environmental protection, disaster risk reduction, water resource management, urban 
development, food security, coastal zone management, and cultural heritage site management 
and conservation. The initiative seeks to improve Earth Observation (EO) data availability, 
quality, and capabilities through the provision of EO infrastructure and technologies and data 
capacity building to help countries mitigate threats to shared ecosystems. Its three main 
objectives are addressing knowledge gaps in earth system processes related to the SDGs in BRI 
countries, promoting big Earth data-based advanced science and decision support services, and 
“to enhance capacity building and technology transfer towards a system of partnerships and 
research networks”. Data streams for the project will include communication, remote sensing, 
and navigation satellites, and oceanic and ground-based observations.  
Dissemination of SDG-relevant outcomes from the initiative is planned to be via “SDG Highlight 
Reports”. If implemented well, the initiative could be transformational for BRI countries, which 
cover 38.5% of the Earth’s land area and are home to a diverse range of fragile environments 
and their knock-on effects including rising sea levels, overfishing, pollution, access to fresh 
water, food security, and exposure to natural hazards among others (Chin & He 2016; Huadong 
2018). The initiative builds on its successful application in cases in China and other developing 
countries, for example the use of aerial imagery following the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake to 
uncover 700 people trapped in a village. The initiative claims to have potential impacts across 
seven of the 17 SDGs namely: SDGs 2, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14 and 15. However, the initiative is 
relatively small – only 32 million USD (Huadong 2018) – and was not within the scope of this 
report so is not covered in detail.  
4. Conclusion and policy implications for traditional 
donors 
In conclusion, the Digital Silk Road is more than ICT infrastructure. Road, port and energy 
infrastructure get most of the attention in the more general BRI literature and ICT infrastructure 
has been largely ignored. The Digital Silk Road has several policy objectives including: dealing 
with overcapacity of Chinese fibre-optic cable and ICT device manufacturers, relieving 
overcapacity of other firms through e-commerce, facilitating the “going out” of Chinese firms in 
general, internationalising the Chinese renminbi, obtaining independence from US-based 
infrastructure by building global ICT networks that are “China-centred”, repositioning China in a 
shifting geopolitical world as a leader of “inclusive globalisation” and spreading the idea of 
                                                   
8 Big data associated with the Earth sciences including but not limited to Earth observation. 
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“internet sovereignty” (Hornby 2017; Shen 2018). Chinese ICT equipment manufacturers are 
increasingly gaining market power and are prioritising regions previously neglected by western 
ICT companies (e.g. Africa). This indeed requires attention. The lack of a central database for 
Digital Silk Road infrastructure projects is a significant gap. One should be created, preferably in 
living format, to better understand the scale of digital ICT infrastructure under the BRI.  
A deeper look at projects being pushed forward as part of the “Digital Silk Road” illustrate that 
China’s digital aspirations go beyond the construction of fibre-optic cables and encompass the 
sale and exportation of a wide range of technologies as China races ahead to become a world 
leader not just in ICT infrastructure but in technology more generally. Thus, thinking of the 
Digital Silk Road as solely about infrastructure is a costly mistake that would blind donors 
from some of its biggest impacts. Like many of the other activities carried out in the more 
general BRI, it can be challenging to define the parameters of the Digital Silk Road. This is a very 
light review of the initiative and does not claim to define or cover all of its parameters. Areas of 
the Digital Silk Road covered in this report include: digital devices, e-commerce, smart cities, and 
the Digital Belt and Road Program Science Plan. Some areas for further exploration include 
the development implications of China’s increasing prominence and potential exportation 
of frontier technologies including: nanotechnology, quantum computing, and artificial 
intelligence. 
The literature on ICTs and the SDGs uncovers both synergies and potential trade-offs 
between accelerating ICT adoption and achieving complex development goals. This 
complex relationship will necessarily have implications for the Digital Silk Road. Although 
digital technologies could be a force for good and help us achieve the SDGs, this trajectory is not 
automatic, nor is it a given, and in many regards current trends show the contrary. The SDGs 
have explicitly called for accelerating ICT adoption in three of the SDG goals and targets (SDGs 
9.C, 5.B, and 17.8). However, some Information Communications Technology for Development 
(ICT4D) scholars have argued that ICTs can have impacts across the SDGs (both positive and 
negative) and that this was not well captured when they were drafted. ICT companies (including 
Chinese companies), development actors, and governments (including the Chinese government) 
have been overemphasising the potential positive impacts ICTs can have on economic growth 
and the SDGs and have largely neglected the potential for ICTs to increase inequality, leave the 
unconnected and most marginalised behind, generate massive amounts of e-waste, emit too 
many greenhouse gases, and support child and forced labour in the supply chain, amongst 
others. Achieving the SDGs in an increasingly digital world will necessarily mean tackling the 
negative side effects of digital development and finding ways to deal with challenges emerging 
from greater ICT adoption. The challenges highlighted in this report are not minor and it is 
unclear whether ICTs will have a net positive or net negative impact on the SDGs. The outcome 
will depend on the actions we take: ensuring ICTs holistically enable SDG achievement requires 
concerted actions – above and beyond building infrastructure – from a wide range of actors. Due 
to the complexity of the relationship between ICTs and the SDGs, no single actor is well 
equipped to tackle these issues alone. Including Chinese actors will be a necessity given their 
increasing profile across ICT-related areas.   
Traditional donors should use their convening power to bring together a wide range of 
stakeholders to work through the synergies and trade-offs of expanding ICTs and 
achieving the SDGs. As Sharafat & Lehr (2017: 30) argue, many factors need to be considered 
and coordinated including “government policies and actions, infrastructure investment, 
applications and content, markets and competition, government budgets, and ICT skills and 
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education”. Given the complexity of the interaction between ICTs and the SDGs, governments, 
businesses, civil society, citizens and development actors will need to look beyond targets and 
plans for ICT-specific SDGs and consider how ICTs can contribute – both positively and 
negatively – to all the other SDGs and set targets accordingly (Unwin 2017). Working through 
this complexity will require action and coordination between many actors including government, 
the private sector, civil society, and citizens – including the unconnected and those at risk of 
being left behind – to come up with solutions that stand the chance of being successful and 
sustainable (ibid.).  Bringing in citizens themselves – especially the most marginalised – will be 
necessary as they have historically not been part of the conversation and are most affected. This 
will necessarily include China and Chinese citizens, but success will be most likely if involvement 
is as diverse and inclusive as possible (ibid.).  
Traditional donors should act as honest knowledge brokers with BRI – and other – 
country governments. There is no conclusive evidence that ICT adoption alone leads to 
economic growth or SDG gains, yet African country ICT strategies, China, and Chinese ICT 
companies push forward a simple narrative of the relationship as causal and linear. Huawei goes 
as far as to claim that small incremental increases in ICT adoption will lead to significant gains in 
SDG indicators. Although their claims are based on data, they are based on a series of 
correlations that do not prove causation. Such claims risk the implementation of very narrow and 
simplistic ICT strategies for problems that are complex and multifaceted. Traditional development 
actors should push back on this narrative to ensure that challenges emerging from ICT usage are 
also dealt with.  
The Digital Silk Road has the potential to improve SDG outcomes across a wide range of 
SDGs. ICT infrastructure built as part of the BRI and the more affordable contextual devices 
made by Chinese device manufacturers will likely improve outcomes towards SDG 9.C by 
improving the availability and affordability of digital connectivity. Moreover, ICT adoption can 
have impact across the SDGs. There is evidence that Chinese device manufacturers are 
investing in research and development and innovation in developing countries and tailoring 
products to those markets (SDG 9.B). Chinese internet giants are helping provide financing to 
technology start-ups in BRI countries (SDG 8.3). Alibaba’s eWTP initiative seeks to promote the 
growth of SMEs by providing them with access to external markets through e-commerce and with 
financial and other services (SDG 8.3 and 9.3). Smart cities are also being promoted in the 
Digital Silk Road and can have positive impacts across several SDGs including ones related to 
health and wellbeing (SDG 3), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), climate action (SDG 13), and 
sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) among others. Lastly, the Digital Belt and Road 
Program Science Plan promises to have positive impacts across seven SDGs.  
However, there are also signs that the Digital Silk Road risks exacerbating negative labour 
rights and environmental outcomes if current trends are not reversed. Like the rest of the 
ICT sector, Chinese-built ICT networks, data centres, and digital device manufacturing are likely 
to continue consuming more energy and emitting more greenhouse gases over the years as 
more people go online and the demand for more data-intensive content increases. Chinese 
companies have been found to be untransparent about their energy sources and are believed to 
mainly rely on coal and non-renewable energy (Greenpeace 2017a). Moreover, there are 
concerns about Chinese digital device manufacturer supply chains. The sector overall is highly 
dependent on child and forced labour at the mineral extraction stage. In addition, Chinese device 
manufacturers have been found to be untransparent about the inclusion of harmful chemicals in 
their devices that may pose health risks to waste pickers and e-waste recyclers (Greenpeace 
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2017b). Furthermore, the desire to spread e-commerce in a similar way to which it spread in 
China requires a significant increase in packages which may pose environmental and health 
risks if not fully recyclable and recycled by citizens. Meanwhile, the SDGs stress that economic 
growth should be decoupled from economic degradation. These challenges are not necessarily 
unique to Chinese digital activities and will need to be tackled by the diverse set of partners and 
stakeholders mentioned earlier.  
The Digital Silk Road does not currently seem to take adequate steps to tackle the 
potential for ICTs to exacerbate inequality and leave marginalised people and small 
businesses behind. Actors in the initiative seem to treat digital inequalities as solely an issue of 
supply (e.g. infrastructure, devices, and platforms) and do not take adequate steps to deal with 
some of the demand side barriers that often hinder individuals from using digital technologies. 
Connecting the most marginalised and at risk of being left behind requires more than building 
digital infrastructure. Partners will also need to work on overcoming demand side barriers. Some 
of these include: the affordability of connectivity and device ownership; awareness of digital 
technology and its usefulness; abilities to use devices and to extract value from them both in 
everyday life and in the world of work; making digital technologies and services accessible to 
disabled people; overcoming social norms that limit women’s agency and desire to get online; 
and content that is relevant to contexts and in the languages spoken by the disconnected. In 
regards to smart cities, there is a need to ensure that bottom-up processes inclusive of 
marginalised groups also feed into their design to ensure that these cities do not mainly serve the 
elite at the cost of overlooking the rights, needs, expectations, and inclusion of offline 
populations. These challenges are not necessarily unique to Chinese digital activities and will 
need to be tackled by the diverse set of partners and stakeholders mentioned earlier. 
Moreover, although Alibaba frames the eWTP and DFTZs as facilitators of “inclusive 
globalisation”, smaller businesses are consistently shown to be online less and receive orders 
online significantly less than larger firms. There are also digital inequalities between SMEs: those 
in major cities are more likely to be online than SMEs in rural areas and SMEs differing in digital 
capabilities. So far, this trend seems to have been replicated rather than overcome in the first 
DFTZ. Jack Ma envisions a future in which SMEs that do not go global go out of business. By 
introducing platforms that facilitate “inclusive globalisation” he may paradoxically accelerate the 
failure of firms unable to go global or compete in a digital economy. For SMEs to take full 
advantage of e-commerce rather than be passive exporters waiting for buyers, they require an 
advanced set of skills including the ability to conduct and respond to market research, find and 
market to new customers online, and to comply with foreign standards, rules and regulations.  
Traditional donors can add value by promoting offline service delivery for the 
unconnected. The overarching SDG of leaving no one behind emphasises prioritising the 
hardest to reach first. As governments, the private sector, and other actors begin to implement 
digital first and digital by default services, efficiency gains and rapid spread of technology may 
include many people for the first time – the digital “low-hanging fruit”; however, these strategies 
risk leaving behind those without digital connectivity or digital skills if offline channels are not built 
alongside digital ones. The digitisation of services relevant to the SDG has not been studied in 
depth in developing countries and more work is needed to fully understand the scope of the 
phenomenon. There may also be elements of digital by default and digital first strategies in the 
Digital Silk Road (e.g. smart cities). Traditional donors may add value by supporting parallel 
offline channels to new digital ones, which although not “cutting edge”, may be the only way the 
unconnected stand a chance of not being left behind in an increasingly digital world.  
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Traditional donors can add value by focusing on the future of work and digital skill 
improvement. The Digital Silk Road does not seem to have a roadmap for dealing with some of 
the tensions between ICT adoption and the potential introduction of automating technologies in 
the workplace that may displace or disadvantage less connected, less digitally literate, and less 
educated workers. Traditional donors already have momentum. The topic was covered in the 
2016 World Development Report and is the focus of the 2019 World Development Report.9  
Traditional donors may need to weigh the risks of being directly involved in BRI-branded 
digital infrastructure projects. Traditional donor country governments have grown weary of 
Chinese 5G infrastructure amidst fears that Chinese ICT equipment suppliers may be required to 
share intelligence information with the Chinese government. Some traditional donor countries 
have banned Chinese ICT equipment manufacturing companies altogether and others have 
considered it. For these countries, supporting Chinese ICT projects in BRI countries may be seen 
as applying a double standard on what infrastructure is good enough for them versus developing 
countries. Moreover, five of the seven countries China is partnering with on the Digital Silk Road 
rank as “Not Free” on the Freedom on the Net index and the other two are not ranked but also 
likely to have an unfree internet. This is not surprising given that China promotes the idea of 
“internet sovereignty” which advocates for greater state control of internet content and each 
country being able to survey and control its internet as it sees fit. This is in contrast to ideas of 
“net neutrality” and multi-stakeholder internet governance, which are widely supported by citizens 
in traditional donor countries. Furthermore, there is a more overarching risk that digital 
technologies exported as part of the Digital Silk Road – including ICT infrastructure and beyond – 
may make it easier for governments across the BRI to breach citizen human rights and curtail 
freedom of speech. Although the language in the SDGs makes it difficult to criticise the Digital 
Silk Road from this angle, traditional donor country taxpayers care about human rights and 
privacy. Similar to how Google’s decision to build a censored version of its browser led to an 
open letter signed by 14 human rights organisations (Access Now et al. 2018), funding digital 
infrastructure projects that may eventually undermine human rights risks public backlash against 
donors at a time when donors are already under increasing scrutiny. However, Chinese-led 
infrastructure in BRI countries and other Digital Silk Road projects will move forward whether or 
not traditional donors engage with these infrastructure projects and this will occur in many 
traditional donor priority countries. Some traditional donors may have to find a balance between 
complementing the Digital Silk Road, helping tackle some of the challenges raised by it, and 
ensuring their efforts do not negatively impact human rights or issues their country’s citizens care 
about.  
This report was limited in its ability to engage with the Digital Silk Road and has only scratched 
the surface. The report was restricted to only seven days of research in August 2018 and was 
not able to delve deeply into potential links between the Digital Silk Road and the SDGs. These 
links thus require further analysis and scrutiny. Moreover, this review was illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. There are likely many other elements branded under the “Digital Silk Road” not 
covered in this report. Some areas for further exploration include: nanotechnology, quantum 
computing, artificial intelligence, and “emerging technologies” more generally. There is also a 
need to understand the potential implications for the SDGs of surveillance technologies and of 
the Chinese social credit system. 
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